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Non Technical Summary 
Germany has made extensive reforms in its tertiary education system since 1999 as part of the 
European Bologna process. The traditional tertiary academic degree programs are being 
replaced by internationally comparable Bachelor and Master degree programs. During the 
period of transition from the traditional degrees to these new tertiary programs, different 
degree types co-existed.  
In this study, I am interested in quantifying whether and how much the choice of a 
new Bachelor vs. a traditional degree program affected first year students’ satisfaction with 
their study program. I draw on recent survey data containing detailed information on how the 
students judge their respective study programs with respect to teaching and organization. I 
also use a score that aggregates information on personal problems which the students 
experience in the academic context. In addition, self-reported grades are observed for a sub-
sample of the students. Students’ selection of the different programs is taken into account. 
The data allow controlling for prior performance, attitudes, and family background as well as 
inclusion of fixed effects on the level of subjects and the specific institution.  
In light of the present skepticism towards the reforms, some of this paper’s results are 
encouraging: I demonstrate that most of the considered outcomes improved since the 
beginning of the Bologna process. However, the changes are very modest. Also, according to 
students’ self-reported problems, their situation hardly differs between traditional and new 
degree programs. Furthermore, the results imply no evidence that the new programs 
specifically attract students from a less advantaged family background. In other words: I do 
not observe that the new programs increase (or decrease) social mobility. 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Das deutsche Hochschulsystem wurde insbesondere im Zuge des europäischen Bologna-
Prozesses seit dem Jahr 1999 tiefgreifend reformiert. Traditionelle Studienabschlüsse wurden 
durch die international vergleichbaren Bachelor- und Master-Abschlüsse ersetzt. Die 
vorliegende Studie bezieht sich auf die Übergangsjahre zwischen diesen neuen und den 
traditionellen Studienabschlüssen. Insbesondere wird der Frage nachgegangen, wie sich die 
Studiengangsreform auf die Studienzufriedenheit der Studienanfänger messbar ausgewirkt 
hat. Zu diesem Zweck werden Umfragedaten verwendet, die Informationen zur Bewertung 
der Studierenden bezüglich der Lehre und der Studienorganisation umfassen. Zudem werden 
die durch die Studierenden berichteten persönlichen Probleme, die sie im akademischen 
Kontext haben, berücksichtigt. Außerdem werden eigene Angaben zu den Studienleistungen 
für einen Teil der Studierenden beobachtet.  
Die Auswertungen tragen der möglichen Eingangsselektion von Studierenden in die 
unterschiedlichen Studiengänge Rechnung. Insbesondere ermöglichen es die Daten, 
vorangehende Leistungen (Abiturnoten), die Studiermotivation und den familiären 
Hintergrund zu berücksichtigen. Auch werden Schätzungen durchgeführt, die „fixe Effekte“ 
auf Ebene der Hochschule und der Fachrichtung einführen.  
Im Lichte eines gewissen öffentlichen Reformskeptizismus, der bisher im Laufe des Bologna-
Prozesses zu verzeichnen war, sind einige Ergebnisse dieser Studie ermutigend: Es zeigt sich, 
dass die meisten beobachteten Ergebnisgrößen sich im Beobachtungszeitraum tendenziell 
positiv entwickelt haben. Diese Veränderungen sind allerdings relativ gering. Außerdem 
implizieren die Ergebnisse, dass sich die persönliche Situation der Studierenden in Hinblick 
auf die von ihnen berichteten Probleme im Zuge der Studiengangsreform kaum verändert hat. 
Schließlich deuten die beobachteten Merkmale zur Eingangsselektion auch nicht darauf hin, 
dass die neuen Studiengänge die soziale Bildungsmobilität erhöhen konnten.  
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Abstract: Germany has recently made extensive reforms in its tertiary education system. 
Traditional degrees are being replaced by Bachelor and Master programs. This study 
examines the question of how the choice of a new Bachelor program as opposed to a 
traditional degree program has affected first-year students’ satisfaction. Three dimensions of 
student satisfaction are focused upon: Student satisfaction with teaching, student satisfaction 
with the organization of the study programs, as well as an indicator for students’ personal 
problems within the academic context. The selection into the type of program is taken into 
account as I control for individual performance at secondary school, motivation and family 
background and try different robustness checks. The main specification includes fixed effects 
on the level of institutions and subjects. Results robustly point to minor differences between 
the programs. The outcomes are slightly more favorable for students in the new programs 
compared to the traditional programs in recent years.  
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1 Introduction  
 
Germany has made extensive reforms in its tertiary education system since 1999 as part of the 
European Bologna process. The traditional tertiary academic degree programs are being 
replaced by internationally comparable Bachelor and Master degree programs. During the 
period of transition from the traditional degrees to these new tertiary programs, different 
degree types co-existed. The introduction of the new programs has been guided by the 
intention of creating a European area of higher education by 2010 (cf. European Ministers of 
Education 1999). In Germany, policy-makers also hoped that well organized new study 
programs that shorten the overall length of study of a first degree would attract more 
secondary school graduates and increase intergenerational educational mobility.1 In fact, these 
have also been central aims of the European reform process since at least 2001 (cf. European 
Ministers of Education 2001).  
In this study, I am interested in quantifying whether and how much the choice of a 
new Bachelor vs. a traditional degree program affected first year students’ satisfaction with 
their study program. I draw on recent survey data containing detailed information on how the 
students judge their respective study programs with respect to teaching and organization. I 
also use a score that aggregates information on personal problems which the students 
experience in the academic context. In addition, self-reported grades are observed for a sub-
sample of the students. Students’ selection of the different programs is taken into account. 
The data allow controlling for prior performance, attitudes, and family background as well as 
inclusion of fixed effects on the level of subjects and the specific institution.   
This study contributes to a new literature determining the impacts of the Bologna 
process. From an empirical point of view, it is still too early to study longer lasting impacts of 
                                                 
1 Compared to the traditional programs, the Bachelor programs typically lead to a first degree within a shorter 
period of time (of about three years). Traditional German programs did not offer independent undergraduate 
degrees in a two tier system as it is the case in the Bachelor/Master-system. Instead, the comprehensive four to 
five year programs directly yielded a graduate degree like the Diplom or Magister (cf. HRK 2004).  
 2
the reform such as labor market effects.2 For Germany, Horstschräer and Sprietsma (2010) 
suggest that aggregated enrollment and dropout rates hardly changed after the introduction of 
Bachelor degrees. The study draws on administrative data and is conducted at the aggregated 
level of departments. Similar descriptive evidence for Germany is provided in the policy 
report by Mühlenweg et al. (2010). In line with this, two further recent policy reports 
document little change of the contents of study programs due to the Bologna reform (cf. 
Winter et al. 2010) as well as modest impacts on the labor market perspective of students (cf. 
Alesi et al. 2010).3  
Evidence related to the Bologna process has been presented for further European 
countries: Several empirical studies draw on the degree reforms in Italy and mainly 
demonstrate that the risk to drop out of university declined after the introduction of the new 
degree types (cf. Cappellari and Lucifora 2010; Di Pietro and Cutillo 2008; D’Hombres 
2007). For Portugal Cardoso et al. (2008) and Portela et al. (2009) show that students’ 
demand for different academic programs at specific institutions tends to be higher for study 
courses that adapted to the new structure early in the Bologna process.  
The present study adds to the recent literature in directly taking individual selection to 
the different degree programs into account. To my knowledge, this is the first study shedding 
light on student satisfaction during the transition period to the new type of degree programs. 
The results are especially important to policy-makers in Germany. Learning about the change 
                                                 
2 In Germany, the first cohorts of Bachelor students have just entered the labor market and it will be an 
interesting future research topic to observe how they compare to the graduates from the traditional programs.  
3 Winter et al. (2010) compare the curricula of traditional and new degree programs for three different subjects 
(chemistry, engineering and sociology). While the results are diverse for the different subjects as well as for 
different Universities they tentatively suggest that the contents of the study program are often very similar before 
and after the reform. The reform seems to be rather a formal reorganization of the study programs than a reform 
of the contents of the programs. Alesi et al. (2010) draw on their institute’s own survey data of German 
graduates and observe their success in entering the labor market. The (short-term) comparisons are descriptive in 
nature. Students’ selection into different programs is not taken into account when discussing the labor market 
outcomes. The findings point to the conclusion that there are no differences concerning the means and duration 
of job search as well as initial job satisfaction.  
 3
of the situation of students during the transition period to the new programs helps to 
determine drawbacks or successes of the new system.4  
The German tertiary education system has recently been criticized. Student 
organizations state that the new study programs are not well organized and are concerned 
about the as of yet unknown acceptance of the new degrees on the labor market. Among their 
main aspirations are a better teaching quality (especially through smaller classes) as well as 
more financial resources for the tertiary institutions overall (cf. HRK 2009).  
In light of the present skepticism towards the reforms, some of this paper’s results are 
encouraging: I demonstrate that most of the considered outcomes improved since the 
beginning of the Bologna process. However, the changes are very modest. Also, according to 
students’ self-reported problems, their situation hardly differs between traditional and new 
degree programs. Furthermore, the results imply no evidence that the new programs 
specifically attract students from a less advantaged family background. In other words: I do 
not observe that the new programs increase (or decrease) social mobility. 
The following paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides information on the 
data-base and summary statistics. Regression results and robustness checks are presented in 
Section 4. Section 5 discusses implications of the findings and concludes.  
2 Data and Descriptive Evidence 
 
I use data from a repeated cross-section survey of students in Germany (Forschungsprojekt 
Studiensituation). This survey is conducted by researchers at the University of Konstanz on 
behalf of the Federal Ministry of Education. The sample for each year of observation consists 
of students at about 25 German Universities and Universities of Applied Sciences which are 
                                                 
4 Examining the selection of students attracted by the new study programs also allows one to deduce whether 
social mobility changed with the introduction of the new programs.  
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assumed to be representative for tertiary institutions in Germany.5 One explicit aim of the 
survey is to learn about the study situation of students. The survey therefore asks for the 
students’ satisfaction with teaching and the organization of the programs as well as for their 
personal problems related to the academic context.  
In order to compare traditional and new study programs, I use the two available data 
waves relating to the post-Bologna years 2003/2004 and 2006/2007.6 I restrict the sample to 
students in their first year of study. Since the number of students opting for the newly 
generated Master programs is still too small in the period of observation, I do not analyze 
students in these programs.7 The subjects of medicine and law studies did not introduce 
Bachelor programs within the period of observation. Therefore students in these subjects are 
excluded from the analysis. Thus, I compare first year students choosing either a Bachelor or 
a traditional program. Additionally, I draw on the sample of first year students from the data 
wave of 2000/2001 in order to generally compare traditional degrees in the absence and in the 
presence of the alternative degree types.8 
 In the years of observation during the reform, my sample suggests that about 19 
percent of first term students are enrolled in Bachelor programs. This is somewhat less than 
the number offered by the Federal Statistic Office, which reports that about 24 percents of 
students are enrolled in Bachelor programs in the relevant years (cf. Statistisches Bundesamt 
2007). In line with the proportion from the administrative data I observe that about two 
percent of students are in Master programs. In light of the Bachelor students being somewhat 
under-represented and as the data do not provide sampling weights, the following descriptive 
                                                 
5 The researchers at the University of Konstanz state that “the sampling strategy as well as the response rates 
[…] allow one to assume that the results are representative for the current population of 1.65 million German 
students at Universities and Universities of Applied Sciences” (cf. http://cms.uni-konstanz.de/ag-
hochschulforschung/studierendensurvey/anlage/, own translation of the German statement). The survey does not 
provide weighting factors. I assume that the absence of weighting factors is not problematic in light of the 
paper’s central estimation strategy (cf. for example Cameron and Trivedi 2009 for weighting in fixed-effects 
regressions).  
6 I pool the observations for these two years in order to increase the number of observations of students in 
Bachelor degrees. The insights of the present paper are robust if only the recent data wave (2006/07) is used. 
7 As a fact, only 99 students would be observed in Master programs in the 2006/2007 data wave. 
8 The traditional degrees mainly include degrees such as the traditional German “Diplom” and “Magister”.  
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statistics have to be taken with a grain of salt. However, the main (fixed-effects) estimates of 
this paper will hardly be affected by this lack of weights (compare footnote 5).  
There are already some students in the new program types in the first year of 
observation: In 2000/01, I observe that nearly 4 percent of students are in Bachelor programs 
and less than one percent of students are in Master programs.9 However, most of the students 
did not have access to Bachelor programs which were offered by very few institutions. In this 
sense, 2000/2001 is considered as a pre-reform year.  
Table 1 and Table 2 provide an overview of individual background variables. Besides 
basic individual characteristics (students’ gender and age), the data contain information on 
parental education and occupational status (Table 1). These variables allow the consideration 
of social or educational mobility of the students. Further variables that may influence 
students’ selection into the type of program are presented in Table 2. This table provides 
information on students’ university entrance grade (Abitur) and their specific motivation to 
enter the program of study. I do not discuss the summary tables in detail. More detail on 
students’ selection into the different programs is provided in the appendix based on a 
regression analysis. The variables (potentially) driving the selection are used as control 
variables when examining the outcomes of students in the different study programs.  
The major outcome variables considered in this paper are evaluation scores created 
from the students’ answers to questions on their satisfaction with their studies.10 The 
individual scores range from 0 to 60. For the so-called teaching score and the organization 
score, a smaller score indicates that the student is less satisfied (with teaching and 
                                                 
9 According to the Federal Statistic Office, the proportion is again somewhat lower for the Bachelor programs 
(about two percent). 
10 Each score is generated by adding up the answers to ten underlying questions, where each answer is measured 
on a zero-to-six-scale. The detailed questions that underlie the scores are presented in the notes to Table 3. In the 
case of a missing observation for one of the questions, the answer is coded 3 in order to define the problem 
score. This implies the assumption that answers are missing for students who have no strong preference for 
expressing an opinion. For the teaching score, there are four individuals where all the underlying variables are 
missing in the sample. For the organization and personal score, there are no individuals where all the information 
is missing.  
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organization respectively). For the personal problem score, a lower score indicates that the 
student suffers from fewer personal problems related to the study situation. 
An overview of the mean scores is given in Table 3. In the recent data waves, the 
overall mean teaching score is about 33. In other words: The mean is close to the middle of 
the scale ranging from zero to 60. The sample mean of the organization score is about 36. 
Both the distributions of the organization and the teaching score thus suggest that – according 
to the students’ statements – there is scope to improve the situation at the Universities.11 The 
sample mean of the personal score is 22. Severe personal problems related to all the different 
dimensions underlying the score are rather rare (79 percent of university students reach a 
score of 30 or less).  
Students’ performance is measured based on the self-reported average grade. Students 
are asked to report their expected grade if they do not have any examination results at the time 
of interview. Grades relate to the German grade scale ranging from 1.0 (top grade) to 6.0 
(failed) and are reported to the precision of one digit in the data-set. For the following 
analysis, grades are multiplied by ten in order to ease the presentation of the effects 
(especially for the regression analysis). In contrast to the other outcome variables, grades are 
not observed for all students but only for a (selected) sub-group of the sample. Because of the 
high incidence of missing values for the grade observations the results for this outcome 
variable have to be taken with a grain of salt.  
In Table 3, means of the outcome variables are provided for students entering 
traditional programs and Bachelor programs in the period of transition to the new programs, 
i.e. in the survey years 2003/04 and 2006/07 (columns 1 and 2). Also, for comparison I 
include the evidence for students who entered the traditional programs in 2000/01 (‘before’ 
                                                 
11 About 5 percent of university students reach only 20 points or fewer. About 25 percent of students reach fewer 
than 30 points. Intuitively, a score of 30 means that (only) six or fewer of the underlying questions are rated on 
the favorable side of the scale. A score of 20 means that less than one third of the underlying questions is rated in 
a favorable way. As many as nine percent of the students at traditional Universities reach an organization score 
of less than 20 (not presented in the table). This indicates that only a minority of organizational questions are 
answered in a favorable way. 
 7
the reform, column 3). Comparisons between students entering the traditional and new 
programs are shown in column 4. Column 5 compares students entering the traditional 
programs before the reform (in 2000/01) and after the reform (in 2003/04 or 2006/07). Table 
3 reveals that the scores related to the teaching and organization of the study programs are 
slightly but significantly more favorable for students in the Bachelor programs. The average 
problem score is somewhat lower for Bachelor-students compared to students in traditional 
programs. It is interesting to note that the Bachelor programs perform in a more favorable 
way than the traditional programs even though there seems to be a positive time trend within 
the traditional programs: In comparison to the reference year 2000/2001 (i.e. since the 
beginning of the Bologna process) teaching and organization are slightly more positively 
evaluated by the average student in the recent data waves. Students’ average grade has 
slightly improved within the traditional study programs (from 2.59 to 2.51 on the German 
grade scale).  
However, this descriptive presentation does not really allow the conclusion of a 
general time trend: For example it might be that teaching and organization have become better 
in the traditional degree, but it just as well might be that the changing groups of students 
selecting into the traditional programs have different conceptions of teaching and 
organization.  
 
3 Comparison of the Traditional Degrees and the Bachelor Degree 
 
How do students’ evaluations, their personal problems as well as their grades differ between 
the Bachelor and the traditional programs? As a starting point to answer this question, Table 4 
presents OLS results where each of the outcome variables is regressed on an indicator 
variable for being in a Bachelor program as well as on the variables potentially driving 
selection into the programs. Including the selection variables aims at reducing the selection 
bias when estimating the effect of a Bachelor degree program. For example, from Table 2 we 
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know that students who chose the study program because of their own abilities and talents are 
less likely to have opted for a Bachelor degree. If (due to their inherent motivation) those 
students are also less likely to positively evaluate their teachers this will negatively bias the 
OLS estimate of the Bachelor degree choice on the teaching outcome if we fail to control for 
students’ motivation.12  
The OLS results suggest that Bachelor degree students fare a little better compared to 
the students in the traditional degree programs. The coefficients on the Bachelor indicator are 
statistically significant but very small (about two points) for the teaching, organization and 
personal score. The coefficient on the average grade is not significant. The last column of 
Table 4 also shows the result for the relative grade within the subject of specialization (i.e. the 
ratio of the individual grade and the average grade within the subject). There is no statistically 
significant relationship between being in a Bachelor program and the relative grade.13 
The favorable results for the Bachelor programs as indicated in Table 4 may be due to 
the fact that the quality of the vanishing traditional programs decreased as the new Bachelor 
programs were introduced. In order to check this, the row labeled “Time effect of traditional 
degree” on the bottom of Table 4 compares the outcomes of students in traditional programs 
before and after the introduction of Bachelor degrees. These are the coefficients from separate 
regressions controlling for all the background characteristics and a dummy variable for 
entering university in 2003/2004 or 2006/07 instead of in the pre-reform year 2006/07. The 
results clearly suggest that ceteris paribus the quality of the traditional program rather 
increased as the new programs were introduced. Students tend to give better teaching and 
organization scores. At the same time, the grades of the students are getting better (decreasing 
                                                 
12 In Table 4 as we control for motivation, we see that in fact there is a positive correlation between this 
motivation indicator and the teaching score. 
13 I do not discuss the coefficients of the control variables in detail. They are included in order to control for 
selection into the different programs. Note that (as suggested above) students who state that they opted for the 
study course because of general interest in the topic, due to their own abilities and talents or specific professional 
aspiration yield better scores or results (with the exception of the insignificant coefficient for the teaching score).  
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towards the better grade in the German grade scale). This is likely to be an expression of 
general grade inflation. 
There are two major types of tertiary academic institutions in Germany. The 
Universität (University) is the traditional type which generally offered four to five year 
programs before the introduction of the new programs. The programs are typically research-
oriented and less applied. In contrast to this, so-called Fachhochschulen (Universities of 
Applied Sciences) tended to offer shorter and less research-oriented programs. It is possible 
that the selection of students into the new programs differs at the different types of 
institutions. Therefore, all estimations of this paper have alternatively been conducted based 
on a sample excluding the (fewer) observations of students at Universities of Applied 
Sciences. However, the findings (not shown for the previous tables) are robust to excluding 
the Universities of Applied Science from the sample. Table 5 repeats the results from the OLS 
regressions of Table 4 for the sample of students at traditional universities. Again, the major 
results are robust in this supposedly more homogeneous group of students.  
In order to potentially reduce more of the bias related to the selection of students into 
the different programs, I conduct fixed-effects regressions.14 Now, the deviation of each of the 
outcome variables of its group mean (within a specific subject offered at a specific institution) 
and the grand mean is regressed on the deviation of each of the selection variables from its 
mean and the grand mean. Thus, any unobserved characteristic that drives the choice of 
institution and subject is eliminated from the estimation of the Bachelor program effect.15 The 
results as presented in Table 6 point to robustness of the estimates presented in Table 4 and 
Table 5: Students in Bachelor programs seem to be in a somewhat more favorable situation 
                                                 
14 All standard errors in this paper are estimated taking clustering within subjects and institutions into account. 
15 The data allow identifying the specific institution. After excluding medicine and law studies, subjects are 
identified by seven categories related to the fields of study. 
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but the effects are not large. Bachelor students’ evaluation of teaching and organization is 
slightly better while they have somewhat fewer personal problems.16  
 
4 Discussion of the Results 
 
The findings indicate that – at the time of transition to the new degree types in Germany – the 
study situation is not less favorable for students in Bachelor programs than for students in 
traditional programs. There are even small but robust positive effects of studying in a 
Bachelor program which are mostly statistically significant for students’ satisfaction with the 
teaching and the organization of the study program as well as for the indicator of students’ 
personal situation. This is true even though (ceteris paribus) the observed quality of the 
traditional programs increased over time after the start of the Bologna process.  
These findings are contrary to the perception that students in the new Bachelor 
programs are worse off than students in traditional programs used to be (cf. Section 1). One 
likely interpretation of the difference of the public perception and the survey-based results is 
that the Bologna process enhanced the public alertness related to the situation of students. 
Also, the public impression of the students’ situation is formed by the statements of the 
student representatives (Fachschaft). If the composition of the group of representatives 
changed over time this might also cause a changing representation style going along with a 
                                                 
16 In addition to these estimation strategies I also tried several instruments for 2SLS estimation of the Bachelor 
program effect. The most promising instrument is the dummy variable for the student’s father being a public 
servant. This instrument is guided by the intuition that less risk-averse students are more likely to opt for the 
traditional study programs and assuming that the father’s status as a public servant is a proxy for the family’s 
risk aversion. The positive first stage F-statistic related to this instrument is just above 10 (12.10). The second 
stage point estimates for the Bachelor program effect on the scores are close to the fixed-effects and the OLS 
estimates and thus robust. The (insignificant) point estimates for the grade effects turn positive. However, it is 
not clear whether the potential local average treatment effect this instrument may identify is really an effect of 
interest. Students opting for the traditional programs because of their risk aversion which is identified by their 
fathers’ being public servants may be a rather selected group. Therefore, the instrumental variable results are not 
presented in detail. 
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changed perception of the students’ situation.17 However, these are just interpretations of the 
findings.  
What the results tell for sure is that students’ judgment of organization and teaching as 
well as their reported personal situation have not gotten worse with the introduction of the 
new degrees. However, the distributions and means of the considered outcome variables 
indicate that there is plenty of scope to improve the study programs (cf. Section 2). Also, the 
available data do not allow for an examination as to how the Bachelor students do with 
respect to outcome variables beyond the ones considered in this paper. For example the (often 
criticized) compatibility of the Bachelor and Master programs at different institutions or the 
labor market success of the graduates remain important research topics for the future – once 
data is available.  
                                                 
17 I checked this latter interpretation based on the survey data: Looking at the entire group of students indicating 
that they are part of the student representatives (Fachschaft) suggests that the composition in fact changed 
somewhat over time. Based on regression analysis, I find for example that student representatives who were 
insecure whether they should enroll in tertiary academic education are more likely to be observed in the recent 
panel waves. There are further differences in representatives’ motivation over time. However, it is generally hard 
to interpret what kind of change in the representation style one would expect from these observed differences. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Individual background of students in traditional and new programs 
Means (standard errors)  
 
 
Traditional
 
 
Bachelor
 
 
Traditional
(Before 
reform) 
Traditional 
– Bachelor 
 
Before  
– After 
reform 
Male  
 
0.45 
(0.01) 
0.40 
(0.02) 
0.47 
(0.01) 
0.05 
 
** 
 
-0.02 
  
Age (in years) 
 
21.61 
(0.07) 
21.77 
(0.14) 
21.59 
(0.10) 
-0.15 
  
0.03 
  
Highest educational level of mother        
   not available 
 
0.03 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
0.04 
(0.01) 
0.00 
  
-0.01 
 
* 
 
   vocational 
 
0.43 
(0.01) 
0.42 
(0.02) 
0.46 
(0.01) 
0.01 
  
-0.03 
 
* 
 
   higher vocational 
 
0.21 
(0.01) 
0.22 
(0.02) 
0.18 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
  
0.03 
 
** 
 
   tertiary academic 
 
0.33 
(0.01) 
0.33 
(0.02) 
0.32 
(0.01) 
0.00 
  
0.01 
  
Highest educational level of father        
   not available 
 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.01) 
0.05 
(0.01) 
0.00 
  
-0.01 
  
   vocational 
 
0.31 
(0.01) 
0.32 
(0.02) 
0.27 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
  
0.04 
 
** 
 
   higher vocational 
 
0.22 
(0.01) 
0.22 
(0.02) 
0.22 
(0.01) 
0.00 
  
0.00 
  
   tertiary academic 
 
0.43 
(0.01) 
0.42 
(0.02) 
0.45 
(0.01) 
0.01 
  
-0.02 
  
Occupation of mother        
   not available 
 
0.15 
(0.01) 
0.14 
(0.01) 
0.15 
(0.01) 
0.01 
  
0.00 
  
   blue collar 
 
0.08 
(0.01) 
0.07 
(0.01) 
0.07 
(0.01) 
0.01 
  
0.00 
  
   white collar 
 
0.54 
(0.01) 
0.56 
(0.02) 
0.56 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
  
-0.02 
  
   public servant 
 
0.14 
(0.01) 
0.12 
(0.01) 
0.11 
(0.01) 
0.02 
  
0.03 
 
** 
 
   self employed 
 
0.09 
(0.01) 
0.11 
(0.01) 
0.10 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
  
-0.01 
  
Occupation of father        
   not available 
 
0.08 
(0.01) 
0.08 
(0.01) 
0.07 
(0.01) 
0.00 
  
0.00 
  
   blue collar 
 
0.20 
(0.01) 
0.22 
(0.02) 
0.17 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
  
0.03 
 
** 
 
   white collar 
 
0.38 
(0.01) 
0.37 
(0.02) 
0.42 
(0.01) 
0.00 
  
-0.04 
 
** 
 
   public servant 
 
0.18 
(0.01) 
0.11 
(0.01) 
0.16 
(0.01) 
0.07 
 
** 
 
0.02 
  
   self employed 
 
0.16 
(0.01) 
0.22 
(0.02) 
0.18 
(0.01) 
-0.05 
 
** 
 
-0.02 
  
Proportion missing observations (%)A 0.23 0.47 0.15     
Sample size 2,349 633 1,310     
Note: The column labeled ‘Traditional – Bachelor’ indicates the difference between the two programs in the years of 
transition to the new degree programs. The column ‘Before – After reform’ indicates the difference between students in the 
traditional programs in the beginning of the Bologna process and during the reform period. A The proportion of missing 
observations refers to the individual background variables in the sample.  
* Difference is significant at the ten percent level (t-Test). ** Significant at the five percent level (t-Test).  
Source: Forschungsprojekt Studiensituation, 2000/2001, 2003/2004 and 2006/2007, sample of first year students.  
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Table 2: Prior performance and motivation of students in traditional and new programs 
Means (standard errors) 
 
 
Traditional 
 
 
Bachelor 
 
 
Traditional 
(Before 
reform) 
Traditional-
Bachelor 
 
Before 
– After 
reform 
Prior performance and motivation 
Abitur degree * 10 
 
23.77 
(0.13) 
24.01 
(0.24) 
23.55 
(0.18) 
-0.24 
  
0.23
 
University enrolment decision: unsecure
 
0.21 
(0.01) 
0.23 
(0.02) 
0.24 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
  
-0.04 **
 
Motivation: Interest in field of study 
 
0.87 
(0.01) 
0.88 
(0.01) 
0.84 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
  
0.03 **
 
Motivation: Own abilities and talents 
 
0.83 
(0.01) 
0.78 
(0.02) 
0.79 
(0.01) 
0.05 
  
0.04 **
 
Motivation: Expected income 
 
0.48 
(0.01) 
0.54 
(0.02) 
0.52 
(0.01) 
-0.06 
 
** 
 
-0.03 **
 
Motivation: Specific professional aspiration 
 
0.46 
(0.01) 
0.44 
(0.02) 
0.45 
(0.01) 
0.02 
  
0.01  
 
Motivation: Variety of job opportunities 
 
0.66 
(0.01) 
0.72 
(0.02) 
0.71 
(0.01) 
-0.07 
 
** 
 
-0.05 **
 
Performance / motivation missing (%) 0.25 0.24 0.22    
Sample size 2,349 633 1,310    
Note: The column labeled ‘Traditional – Bachelor’ indicates the difference between the two programs in the years of 
transition to the new degree programs. The column ‘Before – After reform’ indicates the difference between students in the 
traditional programs in the beginning of the Bologna process and during the reform period. * Difference is significant at the 
ten percent level (t-Test). ** Significant at the five percent level (t-Test).  
Source: Forschungsprojekt Studiensituation, 2000/2001, 2003/2004 and 2006/2007, sample of first year students.  
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Table 3: Outcome variables for students in traditional and new programs 
Means (standard errors)  
 
 
Traditional
 
 
Bachelor
 
 
Traditional
(Before 
reform) 
Traditional 
– Bachelor 
 
Before 
– After 
reform 
Evaluation score: Teaching 
 
33.00 
(0.29) 
33.88 
(0.64) 
31.53 
(0.35) 
-0.89 
 
** 
 
1.47 
 
** 
 
Evaluation score: Organization 
 
36.10 
(0.27) 
37.42 
(0.57) 
34.76 
(0.32) 
-1.32 
 
** 
 
1.35 
 
** 
 
Personal problem score 
 
22.57 
(0.32) 
21.63 
(0.71) 
22.98 
(0.42) 
0.94 
 
** 
 
-0.41 
  
Grade * 10 
 
25.11 
(0.19) 
24.87 
(0.43) 
25.92 
(0.24) 
0.24 
  
-0.80 
 
** 
 
Scores: Missing observations (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00     
Grade: Missing observations (%) 42.83 31.44 47.10     
Sample size 2,349 633 1,310     
Note: The column labeled ‘Traditional – Bachelor’ indicates the difference between the two programs in the years of 
transition to the new degree programs. The column ‘Before – After reform’ indicates the difference between students in the 
traditional programs in the beginning of the Bologna process and during the reform period. * Difference is significant at the 
ten percent level (t-Test). ** Significant at the five percent level (t-Test).  
The teaching score adds up the answers to the following ten fields of evaluation (each coded 0 to 6, 6 = very good): (1) 
teachers are prepared for classes, (2) teachers explain objectives of classes, (3) teachers have a good oral teaching style, (4) 
teachers increase students' motivation, (5) teachers relate to other subjects, (6) teachers relate to applied skills, (7) teachers 
revise and summarize most important points, (8) teachers are interested in students' success, (9) teachers indicate importance 
of material with respect to examinations, (10) teachers explain test results.  
The organization score adds up the answers to the following ten fields of evaluation (each coded 0 to 6, 6 = very good): (1) 
structure of study program, (2) structure of study courses in major subject, (3) transparency of degree requirements, (4) 
structuring of course contents, (5) consulting possibilities for study program, (6) consulting quality by faculty members, (7) 
quality of introductory classes for freshmen, (8) quality of classrooms and equipment, (9) small classes, (10) reliability of 
schedule (important appointments / lectures have not been canceled). 
The personal problem score adds up the answers to the following ten fields (each coded 0 to 6, 6 = severe problems): (1) 
student suffers from lack of fixed study groups, (2) student suffers from lack of contacts to other students , (3) student suffers 
because of competition among students, (4) student suffers because of anonymity at university, (5) student suffers because of 
high number of students, (6) student suffers because of relation to teachers, (7) student suffers because of study work load, 
(8) student suffers because of problems to cope with university life, (9) student suffers from personal problems such as 
depressions or fears, (10) student suffers because of insecure professional future  
Source: Forschungsprojekt Studiensituation, 2000/2001, 2003/2004 and 2006/2007, sample of first year students. 
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Table 4: Program effects on evaluation scores and grades (OLS regressions) 
Sample: All institutions Bachelor degrees vs. traditional degrees 
 
    Teaching 
 
Organization 
 
Personal 
 
Grade 
 
      Relative 
      grade 
Bachelor degree 
 
1.86
(0.47)
**
 
2.05
(0.50)
**
 
-1.52
(0.51)
**
 
-0.73 
(0.45)  
-0.02
(0.02)  
Male 
 
0.89
(0.38)
**
 
2.20
(0.34)
**
 
-2.25
(0.36)
**
 
0.64 
(0.35) 
* 
 
-0.01
(0.01)  
Age 
 
-0.18
(0.13)  
-0.44
(0.12)
**
 
0.24
(0.15)  
0.09 
(0.21)  
0.01
(0.01)  
Age squared 
 
0.00
(0.00)
**
 
0.01
(0.00)
**
 
0.00
(0.00)
**
 
0.00 
(0.00)  
0.00
(0.00)  
Highest educational level of parents 
   not available 
 
-0.26
(1.47)  
-0.22
(1.26)  
0.51
(1.95)  
-0.47 
(1.57)  
-0.04
(0.06)  
   higher vocational 
 
0.02
(0.45)  
0.35
(0.43)  
-0.05
(0.49)  
-0.80 
(0.52)  
-0.03
(0.02)  
   tertiary academic 
 
-0.52
(0.44)  
-0.02
(0.43)  
-0.04
(0.47)  
-0.65 
(0.52)  
-0.03
(0.02)  
Occupation of mother 
   not available 
 
-0.77
(0.55)  
0.31
(0.44)  
-0.11
(0.49)  
-0.41 
(0.45)  
-0.02
(0.02)  
   blue collar 
 
-1.48
(0.67)
**
 
-1.01
(0.65)  
1.12
(0.83)  
1.02 
(0.69)  
0.05
(0.03)
* 
 
   public servant 
 
-0.73
(0.52)  
-0.89
(0.47)
* 
 
0.32
(0.58)  
-1.16 
(0.56) 
** 
 
-0.04
(0.02)
**
 
   self employed 
 
-1.17
(0.59)
**
 
-0.35
(0.56)  
0.32
(0.77)  
-0.97 
(0.64)  
-0.04
(0.03)  
Occupation of father 
   not available 
 
-0.79
(0.86)  
-0.98
(0.67)  
2.94
(0.93)
**
 
0.80 
(0.77)  
0.03
(0.03)  
   blue collar 
 
-1.04
(0.46)
**
 
-0.57
(0.42)  
1.92
(0.56)
**
 
0.82 
(0.48) 
* 
 
0.03
(0.02)  
   public servant 
 
-0.31
(0.44)  
-0.25
(0.46)  
0.73
(0.60)  
-0.14 
(0.52)  
-0.01
(0.02)  
   self employed 
 
-0.14
(0.51)  
-0.41
(0.48)  
-0.10
(0.56)  
0.32 
(0.48)  
0.01
(0.02)  
Prior performance 
Entry grade 
 
-0.08
(0.20)  
-0.43
(0.18)
**
 
0.18
(0.19)  
0.13 
(0.19)  
0.01
(0.01)  
Entry grade squared 
 
0.00
(0.00)  
0.01
(0.00)  
0.00
(0.00)  
0.00 
(0.00)  
0.00
(0.00)  
Prior motivation 
   undecided student 
 
-0.89
(0.47)
* 
 
-0.58
(0.43)  
1.78
(0.46)
**
 
0.72 
(0.47)  
0.04
(0.02)
**
 
   interest in field of study 
 
1.35
(0.53)
**
 
2.57
(0.46)
**
 
-2.21
(0.53)
**
 
-0.44 
(0.44)  
-0.01
(0.02)  
   own abilities and talents 
 
0.83
(0.45)
* 
 
0.17
(0.40)  
-0.83
(0.45)
* 
 
-1.78 
(0.42) 
** 
 
-0.06
(0.02)
**
 
   expected income 
 
-1.15
(0.39)
**
 
0.30
(0.37)  
0.50
(0.41)  
0.40 
(0.34)  
-0.01
(0.01)  
   specific professional aspiration 
 
1.44
(0.37)
**
 
0.48
(0.30)  
-0.63
(0.35)
* 
 
-0.56 
(0.34)  
-0.02
(0.01)
* 
 
   variety of job opportunities 
 
1.89
(0.37)
**
 
1.76
(0.39)
**
 
-0.61
(0.40)  
-0.42 
(0.36)  
-0.02
(0.01)  
Constant 
 
32.95
(3.46)
**
 
44.17
(2.61)
**
 
19.79
(3.42)
**
 
22.40 
(3.79) 
** 
 
0.85
(0.15)
**
 
Time effect of traditional degree (A) 
 
0.99
(0.31)
**
 
0.85
(0.30)
**
 
-0.06
(0.32)  
-0.60 
(0.29) 
** 
 
-0.02
(0.01)
**
 
Number of observation (B) 2,921  2,921  2,921  1,184  1,184  
Note: (A) The time effect stems from a separate regression for the sample of traditional degree students before and after the 
reform. The coefficient indicates the change in the evaluation and performance after the reform. This time effects regression 
includes all variables as in the main regression. (B) The indicator of the number of observation refers to the main regression.  
* Significant at the ten percent level. ** Significant at the five percent level.  
Source: Forschungsprojekt Studiensituation, 2000/2001, 2003/2004 and 2006/2007, sample of first year students.  
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Table 5: Program effects on evaluation scores and grades (Traditional Universities) 
Sample: Universities Bachelor degrees vs. traditional degrees 
Teaching Organization
 
Personal 
 
Grade 
 
 Relative  
 grade 
Bachelor degree 
 
1.20
(0.49)
**
 
1.66
(0.57)
**
 
-1.53
(0.58)
**
 
-0.45 
(0.54)  
-0.01
(0.02)  
Male 
 
1.10
(0.40)
**
 
2.17
(0.37)
**
 
-2.50
(0.38)
**
 
0.14 
(0.39)  
-0.02
(0.01)  
Age 
 
-0.41
(0.14)
**
 
-0.67
(0.13)
**
 
0.47
(0.17)
**
 
0.08 
(0.23)  
0.01
(0.01)  
Age squared 
 
0.01
(0.00)
**
 
0.01
(0.00)
**
 
-0.01
(0.00)
**
 
0.00 
(0.00)  
0.00
(0.00)
* 
 
Highest educational level of parents 
   not available 
 
-0.58
(1.61)  
-0.54
(1.47)  
2.03
(2.23)  
0.33 
(1.74)  
-0.02
(0.07)  
   higher vocational 
 
0.04
(0.52)  
0.74
(0.48)  
-0.10
(0.57)  
-0.74 
(0.62)  
-0.03
(0.02)  
   tertiary academic 
 
-0.61
(0.49)  
0.19
(0.49)  
-0.21
(0.53)  
-0.47 
(0.64)  
-0.02
(0.02)  
Occupation of mother 
   not available 
 
-0.36
(0.62)  
0.82
(0.46)
* 
 
-0.49
(0.52)  
-0.84 
(0.51)  
-0.04
(0.02)
* 
 
   blue collar 
 
-1.22
(0.80)  
-0.90
(0.76)  
0.42
(0.94)  
1.26 
(0.69) 
** 
 
0.05
(0.03)
**
 
   public servant 
 
-0.66
(0.58)  
-1.01
(0.51)
* 
 
0.67
(0.62)  
-1.42 
(0.62) 
** 
 
-0.06
(0.02)
**
 
   self employed 
 
-1.45
(0.65)
**
 
-0.64
(0.63)  
0.87
(0.83)  
-0.89 
(0.70)  
-0.04
(0.03)  
Occupation of father 
   not available 
 
-0.86
(1.05)  
-1.02
(0.72)  
3.49
(1.07)
**
 
0.85 
(0.94)  
0.03
(0.04)  
   blue collar 
 
-1.34
(0.54)
**
 
-0.58
(0.49)  
2.33
(0.61)
**
 
1.20 
(0.54) 
** 
 
0.04
(0.02)
**
 
   public servant 
 
-0.27
(0.46)  
-0.13
(0.50)  
0.51
(0.66)  
0.17 
(0.59)  
0.01
(0.02)  
   self employed 
 
0.09
(0.57)  
-0.23
(0.55)  
-0.23
(0.64)  
0.17 
(0.56)  
0.00
(0.02)  
Prior performance 
Entry grade 
 
-0.10
(0.22)  
-0.47
(0.20)
**
 
0.43
(0.21)
**
 
0.22 
(0.21)  
0.01
(0.01)  
Entry grade squared 
 
0.00
(0.00)  
0.01
(0.00)  
-0.01
(0.00)  
0.00 
(0.00)  
0.00
(0.00)  
Prior motivation 
   undecided student 
 
-1.01
(0.57)
* 
 
-0.80
(0.50)  
2.29
(0.52)
**
 
0.73 
(0.56)  
0.04
(0.02)
**
 
   interest in field of study 
 
1.53
(0.59)
**
 
2.75
(0.53)
**
 
-2.49
(0.62)
**
 
-0.26 
(0.51)  
-0.01
(0.02)  
   own abilities and talents 
 
0.83
(0.53)  
-0.03
(0.44)  
-0.74
(0.47)  
-1.94 
(0.48) 
** 
 
-0.07
(0.02)
**
 
   expected income 
 
-1.40
(0.43)
**
 
0.22
(0.41)  
0.72
(0.43)
* 
 
0.36 
(0.40)  
0.00
(0.01)  
   specific professional aspiration 
 
1.04
(0.41)
**
 
0.25
(0.34)  
-0.54
(0.41)  
-0.64 
(0.37) 
* 
 
-0.03
(0.01)
* 
 
   variety of job opportunities 
 
1.81
(0.41)
**
 
1.64
(0.44) **
-0.29
(0.45)  
-0.35 
(0.38)  
-0.02
(0.01)  
Constant 
 
36.84
(3.66)
**
 
48.34
(2.87)
**
 
13.77
(3.65)
**
 
21.77 
(4.14) 
** 
 
0.78
(0.16)
**
 
Time effect of traditional degree (A) 
 
1.15
(0.32)
**
 
1.16
(0.33)
**
 
-0.51
(0.37)  
-0.75 
(0.35) 
** 
 
-0.03
(0.01)
**
 
Number of observation (B) 2,358  2,358  2,358  950  950  
Note: (A) The time effect stems from a separate regression for the sample of traditional degree students before and after the 
reform. The coefficient indicates the change in the evaluation and performance after the reform. This time effects regression 
includes all variables as in the main regression. (B) The indicator of the number of observation refers to the main regression.  
* Significant at the ten percent level. ** Significant at the five percent level.  
Source: Forschungsprojekt Studiensituation, 2000/2001, 2003/2004 and 2006/2007, sample of first year students. 
 17
Table 6: Fixed-effects regressions of program effects (Subject/institution fixed-effects) 
 Teaching Organization Personal Grade 
Bachelor degree 
 
1.76
(0.52)
** 
 
2.09
(0.59)
** 
 
-1.98
(0.59)
** 
 
-0.64 
(0.52)  
Male 
 
1.09
(0.42)
** 
 
1.20
(0.31)
** 
 
-1.95
(0.42)
** 
 
-0.42 
(0.41)  
Age 
 
-0.39
(0.14)
** 
 
-0.32
(0.11)
** 
 
0.38
(0.18)
** 
 
0.74 
(0.22) 
** 
 
Age squared 
 
0.01
(0.00)
** 
 
0.00
(0.00)
** 
 
-0.01
(0.00)
** 
 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
** 
 
Highest educational level of parents 
   not available 
 
-0.61
(1.53)  
-0.32
(1.18)  
0.42
(1.96)  
-0.01 
(1.42)  
   higher vocational 
 
0.09
(0.45)  
0.26
(0.42)  
0.10
(0.51)  
-0.84 
(0.56)  
   tertiary academic 
 
-0.54
(0.43)  
0.20
(0.37)  
-0.30
(0.47)  
-0.81 
(0.56)  
Occupation of mother 
   not available 
 
-0.27
(0.60)  
0.55
(0.42)  
-0.01
(0.51)  
-0.38 
(0.47)  
   blue collar 
 
-0.99
(0.69)  
-0.69
(0.64)  
1.04
(0.86)  
1.19 
(0.71) 
* 
 
   public servant 
 
-0.57
(0.54)  
-0.62
(0.42)  
0.34
(0.58)  
-0.66 
(0.54)  
   self employed 
 
-1.18
(0.56)
** 
 
-0.35
(0.54)  
0.54
(0.77)  
-1.01 
(0.65)  
Occupation of father 
   not available 
 
-0.72
(0.93)  
-1.17
(0.71)
* 
 
2.94
(0.99)
** 
 
0.53 
(0.84)  
   blue collar 
 
-1.22
(0.48)
** 
 
-0.52
(0.41)  
1.85
(0.53)
** 
 
0.87 
(0.50) 
* 
 
   public servant 
 
-0.27
(0.45)  
-0.40
(0.44)  
0.79
(0.59)  
0.03 
(0.53)  
   self employed 
 
0.02
(0.52)  
-0.15
(0.48)  
-0.14
(0.58)  
0.36 
(0.48)  
Prior performance 
Entry grade 
 
-0.04
(0.20)  
-0.11
(0.17)  
0.04
(0.20)  
0.30 
(0.19)  
Entry grade squared 
 
0.00
(0.00)  
0.00
(0.00)  
0.00
(0.00)  
0.00 
(0.00)  
Prior motivation 
   undecided student 
 
-0.88
(0.49)
* 
 
-0.50
(0.39)  
2.13
(0.46)
** 
 
1.42 
(0.48) 
** 
 
   interest in field of study 
 
1.18
(0.54)
** 
 
1.72
(0.45)
** 
 
-2.02
(0.57)
** 
 
-0.40 
(0.45)  
   own abilities and talents 
 
0.82
(0.48)
** 
 
0.53
(0.39)  
-1.03
(0.46)
** 
 
-1.76 
(0.47) 
** 
 
   expected income 
 
-1.06
(0.39)
** 
 
0.12
(0.35)  
0.79
(0.42)
* 
 
0.00 
(0.37)  
   specific professional aspiration 
 
1.30
(0.38)
** 
 
0.74
(0.29)
** 
 
-0.71
(0.36)
* 
 
-0.38 
(0.35)  
   variety of job opportunities 
 
1.64
(0.36)
** 
 
1.65
(0.38)
** 
 
-0.26
(0.42)  
-0.35 
(0.35)  
Constant 
 
35.98
(3.32)
** 
 
39.40
(2.68)
** 
 
18.56
(3.64)
** 
 
12.05 
(3.87) 
** 
 
Time effect of traditional degree (A) 
 
1.15
(0.31)
** 
 
0.70
(0.31)
** 
 
0.14
(0.35)  
-0.30 
(0.29)  
Number of observation (B) 2,921  2,921  2,921  1,184  
Note: (A) The time effect stems from a separate regression for the sample of traditional degree students before and after the 
reform. The coefficient indicates the change in the evaluation and performance after the reform. This time effects regression 
includes all variables as in the main regression. (B) The indicator of the number of observation refers to the main regression.  
* Significant at the ten percent level. ** Significant at the five percent level.  
Source: Forschungsprojekt Studiensituation, 2000/2001, 2003/2004 and 2006/2007, sample of first year students.  
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Appendix: Selection of Students into Study Programs  
 
How do students who opt for a Bachelor program differ from students in traditional programs 
during the reform period? Table A 1 presents regression results related to students’ selection. 
The dependent variable is a binary indicator for studying in a Bachelor program at the time of 
transition to the new degree programs (i.e. based on the survey years 2003/04 and 2006/07). 
Two different specifications are presented. Firstly, only parental background is controlled 
for.18 Secondly, students’ prior grades and motivation to enter a degree program are added. 
Besides the comparison of traditional degrees and Bachelor degrees (columns 1 and 2 of 
Table A 1), the table also presents the comparison of the groups of students selecting the 
traditional programs in the years during the reform process as compared to the beginning of 
the reform (i.e. compared to the year 2000/01, columns 3 and 4 of Table A 1).  
Fathers’ occupation and students’ motivation when entering tertiary education are 
significant determinants for the chosen type of degree program. The coefficients of parental 
education do not point to a general difference in intergenerational education mobility of the 
types of program. Students’ whose fathers’ are self-employed are more likely to opt for a 
Bachelor degree. If the father is a public servant, students’ are less likely to be in a Bachelor 
program (difference of six percentage points in the full specification). One likely 
interpretation is that more conservative students (i.e. students whose fathers are public-
servants) opt for the traditional degrees while less conservative or more risk-averse students 
(i.e. students whose fathers are self-employed) go for the new programs.  
Concerning students’ prior motivation students opting for their study programs 
because of a general interest in the field of study, higher expected incomes or a larger variety 
in expected job opportunities are significantly more likely to be in Bachelor programs than in 
                                                 
18 In order to save degrees of freedom, parental education is aggregated to categorical variables indicating the 
highest degree of education of mother and father. The results are also robust if separate indicators for both 
parents are included. None of the parental education dummies ever turns statistically significant.  
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traditional programs. Students’ who are motivated by their own abilities and talents are more 
likely to opt for a traditional program than for a Bachelor program. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table A 1 include the pre-reform year 2000/01 in the sample and 
demonstrate how students’ selection to the traditional degree changed since the beginning of 
the reform. Now, the outcome variable is a binary indicator for studying in the traditional 
programs in the years of the reform process as compared to 2000/01. The evidence suggests 
that the selection of students has changed by family background. Students whose fathers are 
blue collar workers are especially often observed in the recent data waves. This is likely to 
reflect a general increase in social mobility over time (independent of the reforms). Such an 
increase is documented in previous official reports on the development of student background 
in Germany (cf. BMBF/HIS 2007) and is similar to the development in other European 
countries (cf. EUROSTAT 2009).19 
Additionally, the results point to a changing motivation to study in the traditional 
programs in the beginning and during the transition process: High school graduates who are 
unsure whether they should go on for a tertiary academic degree tend to enroll less often in 
more recent years. Also, students who indicate that their enrollment decision has been driven 
by their own abilities and talents are more likely to be observed in the traditional programs in 
the more recent years. Students who state that they attend their university program because of 
the variety of job opportunities are less often observed in traditional programs in the years of 
the reform. 
In sum, the main insight from this appendix is that the new study programs did not 
specifically attract students from a more or less advantaged social background. There is a 
general trend of increasing social mobility but this trend seems not to be enforced by the new 
degree programs. There is some selection into the different programs according to students’ 
motivation to attend the academic programs.  
                                                 
19 The evidence here together with Table 1 and Table 2 additionally points to the general educational expansion 
in the generation of parents and especially among mothers.  
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Table A 1: Selection into programs (Linear probability models) 
Model 
 
Bachelor degrees vs.  
traditional degrees 
Traditional degrees after vs.  
before reform 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 1 Specification 2 
Male 
 
-0.04
(0.02)  
-0.04
(0.02)
* 
 
-0.02
(0.02)  
-0.03 
(0.02)  
Age (in years) 
 
0.01
(0.01)  
0.01
(0.01)  
0.00
(0.01)  
0.01 
(0.01)  
Age squared 
 
0.00
(0.00)  
0.00
(0.00)  
0.00
(0.00)  
0.00 
(0.00)  
Highest educational level of parents (reference category: vocational degrees or less) 
   not available 
 
-0.03
(0.06)  
-0.02
(0.06)  
-0.08
(0.06)  
-0.08 
(0.07)  
   higher vocational 
 
-0.01
(0.02)  
-0.01
(0.02)  
0.00
(0.03)  
0.00 
(0.03)  
   tertiary academic 
 
0.02
(0.02)  
0.02
(0.02)  
-0.02
(0.02)  
-0.02 
(0.02)  
Occupation of mother (reference category: white collar worker) 
   not available 
 
-0.02
(0.02)  
-0.02
(0.02)  
0.01
(0.03)  
0.01 
(0.03)  
   blue collar worker 
 
-0.03
(0.03)  
-0.03
(0.03)  
-0.01
(0.03)  
-0.02 
(0.03)  
   public servant 
 
-0.02
(0.02)  
-0.02
(0.02)  
0.07
(0.02)
** 
 
0.08 
(0.02) 
** 
 
   self employed 
 
0.01
(0.03)  
0.01
(0.03)  
-0.01
(0.03)  
-0.01 
(0.03)  
Occupation of father (reference category: white collar worker) 
   not available 
 
0.00
(0.03)  
0.00
(0.03)  
0.04
(0.03)  
0.03 
(0.03)  
   blue collar worker 
 
0.03
(0.02)  
0.03
(0.02)  
0.06
(0.02)
** 
 
0.07 
(0.02) 
** 
 
   public servant 
 
-0.07
(0.02)
** 
 
-0.06
(0.02)
** 
 
0.04
(0.02)
* 
 
0.04 
(0.02) 
* 
 
   self employed 
 
0.05
(0.02)
** 
 
0.05
(0.02)
** 
 
0.00
(0.02)  
-0.01 
(0.02)  
Prior performance 
Entry grade 
 
---
---  
0.01
(0.01)  
---
---  
0.01 
(0.01)  
Entry grade squared 
 
---
---  
0.00
(0.00)  
---
---  
0.00 
(0.00)  
Prior motivation      
   undecided student 
 
---
---  
0.02
(0.02)  
---
---  
-0.06 
(0.02) 
** 
 
   interest in field of study 
 
---
---  
0.04
(0.02)
* 
 
---
---  
0.04 
(0.03)  
   own abilities and talents 
 
---
---  
-0.06
(0.02)
** 
 
---
---  
0.04 
(0.02) 
* 
 
   expected income 
 
---
---  
0.04
(0.02)
* 
 
---
---  
-0.02 
(0.02)  
   specific professional aspiration 
 
---
---  
-0.02
(0.02)  
---
---  
0.00 
(0.02)  
   variety of job opportunities 
 
---
---  
0.04
(0.02)
** 
 
---
---  
-0.05 
(0.02) 
** 
 
Constant 
 
0.06
(0.12)  
-0.06
(0.17)  
0.58
(0.14)
** 
 
0.35 
(0.18) 
* 
 
Number of observations 2,972  2,921  3,650  3,588  
Note: The columns labeled ‘Bachelor degrees vs. traditional degrees’ indicate the selection of students into the different 
programs in the years of transition to the new degree programs. The columns labeled ‘Traditional degrees after vs. before 
reform’ indicate the different background of students in traditional programs during the reform period as compared to the in 
the beginning of the Bologna process. * Significant at the ten percent level. ** Significant at the five percent level.  
Source: Forschungsprojekt Studiensituation, 2000/2001, 2003/2004 and 2006/2007, sample of first year students.  
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